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The specificity of Israeli parliamentary 
democracy
Israel’s democracy is an eminently representative 
political system. This is a response to the high de-
gree of ethnic, religious and philosophical diversity 
of its society. About 74% of the country’s citizens 
are Jews, half of whom do not participate actively 
in religious life; a significant number do belong 
to traditional and orthodox factions, and around 
12 percent are ultra-Orthodox. The Jewish popula-
tion is also clearly divided according to their origin. 
The Mizrahi people are those whose ancestors 
lived in the Middle East and North Africa during 
the Diaspora; the Ashkenazi Jews came to Israel 
from Central and Eastern Europe; and Sephard-
ic Jews immigrated from the Iberian peninsula, 
southern Europe, the Balkans and Turkey. These 
groups are all similar in size, although Sephardim 
are sometimes counted in both the Ashkenazi 
and Mizrahi groups. Recent immigrants, such as 
Russian-speaking Jews (as part of the Ashkenazi 
Jews) and Ethiopians (as part of the Mizrahi Jews), 
also retain their separate identities. In addition, 
21% of Israel’s citizens are Arabs, most of whom 
are adherents of Sunni Islam.
Parliamentary representation for such a diverse 
society is ensured through a highly fragmented 
party system. The low electoral threshold (3.25%) 
The grand coalition government in Israel
New faces of the political crisis
Karolina Zielińska
After three rounds of early parliamentary elections in Israel, in May 2020 a grand coalition government 
was sworn in. The parties that make it up belong to a block of conservative and religious groups centred 
on the Likud bloc of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, together with the centre-left bloc associated 
with the Blue and Whites led by Binyamin Gantz. However, the appointment of a government does not 
mean the end of the political crisis. Uncertainty about the intentions of the central figure on Israel’s 
political scene, Prime Minister Netanyahu, continues. It is not clear whether he will hand over office 
to Gantz in November 2021 in accordance with the coalition agreement, or how he intends to deal 
with the trial that has just started in which he has been charged with corruption. Moreover, the ruling 
coalition has already been shaken by conflicts, a situation which has been exacerbated by the presence 
in the Knesset of an opposition which is strong and has been gaining increasing support in the polls. 
Matters have also been made more difficult by the challenges connected with the second wave of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the country’s economic problems and the protests they have motivated.
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contributes to the fragmentation of the politi-
cal scene, and is usually bypassed by creating 
alliances between parties, although these are 
often temporary and impermanent1. Although 
some groups have become permanent elements 
of the political scene (such as the right-wing Likud, 
the left-wing Labour Party, and the two parties 
representing the ultra-Orthodox population, one 
Mizrahi and the other Ashkenazi), there are no 
clearly numerically predominant groups. This is 
evidenced by the fact that the 1992 elections were 
the last in which over 30% of citizens voted for 
any single electoral list. At the same time, from 
that time to 2019, there were only two occasions 
(in the elections of 1996 and 2009) when the 
two winning electoral lists received comparable 
shares of the vote amounting to over 20%. This 
then happened in the three most recent elec-
tions (April 2019, September 2019, March 2020), 
when the polarisation of opinions led to the clear 
emergence of two winning electoral lists, who 
were supported each time by 25–30% of voters.
The problem of forming and maintaining rul-
ing coalitions in the face of a highly fragmented 
parliament is not new. In Israel, such coalitions 
have changed many times during their terms of 
office or during early parliamentary elections. Rule 
by grand coalitions is seen as a consequence of 
the fragmented political scene, and usually enjoys 
a great deal of support2. Unity governments have 
been formed twice (1984–1988; 1988–1990), in 
which opposing blocs (then formed around Likud 
and the Labour Party) received an equal number 
of ministries, rotated prime ministers, and had 
mutual vetoes on key issues3.
1 For example, “there were 47 mergers, break-ups and re-
namings of parliamentary groups” in the period 1999–2015. 
K. Haczko, A. Skorek, Ł.T. Sroka, Demokracja izraelska, 
Warsaw 2018, p. 195.
2 A. Arian, ‘Israel’s National Unity Governments and Domestic 
Politics’ in A. Arian, M. Shamir (ed.), The Elections in Israel 
– 1988, Westview Special Studies on the Middle East 1990, 
pp. 205–22.
3 D. Horowitz, ‘Politics of Mutual Veto: The Israeli National 
Coalition’ in A. Arian, M. Shamir (eds.), The Elections in 
Israel – 1988, op. cit., pp. 223–34.
The need to reconcile conflicting interests, as 
well as the radically different lifestyles and value 
systems of individual groups, also makes it dif-
ficult to manage the state; this often leads to un-
satisfactory compromises which only temporar-
ily solve problems or postpone their resolution. 
One example is the dispute over the compulsory 
conscription of the ultra-Orthodox community 
(in particular yeshiva students).
The unique nature of the 2019–2020 
crisis
However, the crisis observed from December 2018 
to May 2020, when elections were held three 
times, was unprecedented in terms of its duration; 
the systemic challenge it posed, as many proce-
dures were used for the first time in Israeli history 
in the face of the protracted political deadlock; 
and the high temperature and personalisation of 
the dispute. The tone of the issues dividing voters 
became harsher and more extreme during the 
course of the campaign (such as the privileges of 
the ultra-Orthodox community and the future of 
Jewish settlement on the West Bank). The elec-
tions became more and more a plebiscite on the 
continuation of the rule of Netanyahu, who had 
been in power continuously since 2009, and was 
attracting ever more controversy, including for his 
trial on corruption charges.
The formation of the government was possible 
thanks to the volte-face performed by Gantz, 
the former chief of the General Staff, who for 
more than a year has been the informal leader 
of the centrist and left-wing opposition groups, 
and entered politics under the slogan of remov-
ing Netanyahu from office. He refrained from 
cooperating with the prime minister in connec-
tion with the charges against him and his use of 
electoral procedures to maintain power. Gantz 
agreed to form a government of unity due to the 
need to end the political crisis, especially in the 
face of the COVID-19 pandemic. This also led 
to his devising what was probably the only way 
of ending Netanyahu’s premiership – the formula 
of rotating the position.
Israel’s democracy reflects the eth-
nic, religious and philosophical di-
versity of its citizens.
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The government is composed of two blocs which 
each received an equal number of ministries: the 
bloc of conservative and religious parties centred 
around Netanyahu’s Likud, and a centre-left bloc 
associated with the Blue and White party under 
Gantz (see Appendix). Netanyahu will remain 
prime minister until November 2021, and then 
the office is to be assumed by Gantz, who in the 
meantime has been given the newly created posi-
tion of ‘alternative prime minister’ and the post of 
defence minister. This formally ended the political 
crisis, which had lasted for eighteen months, but 
the coalition is mainly a government of national 
unity in name only; unlike the unity governments 
of the 1980s, due to the mutual distrust of the 
coalition partners, statutory guarantees have been 
introduced to ensure Netanyahu hands over power 
(Gantz was sworn in as the future Prime Minister).
Netanyahu thus kept his position, but his position 
was weakened. In the new coalition, the bloc 
associated with Gantz has a right of veto, which 
means that the right-wing parties cannot push 
through their own reforms, such as those aimed 
at limiting the prerogatives of the Supreme Court, 
or pushing through a conservative shift in edu-
cation and culture. Therefore, the Yamina party 
led by Naftali Bennett decided not to enter the 
government, which put Netanyahu in a situation, 
for the first time in years, when there is an op-
position to his right as well as his left. Hitherto, 
the prime minister had basically succeeded in 
co-opting right-wing parliamentary groups into 
the coalitions he formed, which made it difficult 
for them to challenge his status as leader of the 
conservative camp.
Gantz joined the government and gained new 
influence over the affairs of state at the expense of 
his own grouping, which was abandoned by half 
of its MPs who opposed his decision to cooperate 
with Netanyahu; these are centred around Yair 
Lapid and his Yesh Atid party. This means that the 
fragmentation of the centre-left of the political 
scene has reopened, and at the same time, the 
position of leader of the parliamentary opposition 
has been handed over to Lapid. Moreover, the 
initial public support for the grand coalition has 
waned rapidly amid controversies over the size of 
the government (the new ministerial posts which 
Netanyahu needed to satisfy his political base are 
adding significant costs to the state budget), not 
to mention the mounting economic crisis and the 
second wave of COVID-19. This has fed speculation 
that the prime minister may take further steps 
to ensure that he remains in power, despite his 
ongoing criminal trial and his commitment to hand 
over the prime minister’s seat to Gantz.
The political phenomenon of Prime 
Minister Netanyahu
The chairman of Likud, the largest parliamentary 
faction, is the central figure in Israeli political life 
and has the greatest influence on the country’s 
political future. The roots of the success of his 
premiership, which began in 2009, can be found 
in many political and personal factors. Likud, al-
though it is no longer a mass party, has a stable 
electorate. It is mainly made up of the lower mid-
dle classes of Mizrahi origin, for whom economic 
growth, security and emphasising their national 
and religious identity are particularly important, 
which Netanyahu has successfully guaranteed. 
Although the prime minister’s ‘American’ style 
(his media-led presentation and the personalisa-
tion of politics) does not sit well with some of the 
group’s establishment, his leadership has been 
determined by his ability to win elections and 
form coalitions. Moreover, there seems to be no 
alternative to him; for many years no politician 
has emerged, either within Likud, the centre or 
the left, who can compare to him in terms of 
charisma or experience.
Netanyahu has also been favoured by external 
circumstances: the Arab states’ concern about the 
regional expansion of Iran (a state which Israel 
perceives as an existential threat), their decreasing 
pressure to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
and their growing readiness to normalise rela-
tions with Israel. Thanks to the prime minister’s 
The challenges faced by the Israeli 
political system are largely universal 
to Western democracies.
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personal commitment, Israel has maintained good 
relations with the US, Russia and China at the 
same time, and significantly expanded relations 
with neighbouring Cyprus and Greece, as well as 
countries in Asia (including India), sub-Saharan 
Africa and Australia.
On the other hand, the problematic consequences 
of the prime minister’s style of ruling soon began 
to emerge. First: he has a habit of avoiding deci-
sions on controversial matters, primarily those 
related to the mutually contradictory demands 
of his ultra-Orthodox coalition partners and the 
broad mass of non-orthodox or non-religious 
Jews (in matters such as the conscription of ultra-
Orthodox Jews, the influence of the rabbinate 
on recognising conversions and weddings, and 
the rules on observing kashrut and the Sabbath 
in public places).
Second: excessive concentration of power within 
a small circle. Netanyahu has had the habit of 
serving as a minister in several other ministries 
simultaneously with the prime ministership. This 
has led to the weakening of those portfolios in 
favour of the prime minister’s office, and to the 
neglect of these areas, as they have not had any-
one advocating on their behalf in the cabinet. This 
weakness in government has also manifested itself 
in Netanyahu attributing successes to himself, 
while being reluctant to take responsibility for 
any failures.
Third: tendencies which the Prime Minister’s op-
ponents call anti-democratic. Netanyahu and 
his people have verbally attacked the opposition 
media more and more frequently, and conducted 
public discourse in a way which excludes the Arab 
minority from the civic community (such as his 
warning about “Arabs voting en masse”, or the 
law on the Jewish character of the state; however, 
during his rule, an unprecedented programme of 
investments in the Arab sector has also been im-
plemented). The accusations that Netanyahu has 
accepted gifts from his acquaintances in business, 
together with suspicions that he has made deals 
aimed at influencing the independent media, have 
led to his making rhetorical attacks against law 
enforcement and the judiciary. This has brought 
Likud closer to the hard right, which has been 
demanding that limitations be placed on the 
prerogatives of the Supreme Court, which in Israel 
monitors any potentially unconstitutional actions 
(for example, restricting the rights of minorities, 
or tightening policy in the occupied territories) 
by the government and parliament.
After the parliamentary elections in 2015, Netan-
yahu gave up the possibility of forming a coalition 
with centrist parties, and began efforts to monop-
olise the right of the political scene. The growing 
probability of his prosecution in court increasingly 
inclined him to use subterfuges over the past year 
(for example, pushing through legislation extend-
ing the scope of the prime minister’s immunity) 
to extend his presence in a post which would give 
him a better position should he be forced to trial. 
He has also began to employ populist rhetoric, 
based on deepening social divisions, directed 
against the alleged left-wing ‘deep state’, which 
supposedly represents the interests of the Ash-
kenazi elite that ruled Israel from 1948 to 1977.
The prime minister’s tight grasp on power, com-
bined with the strengthening of the opposition 
forces that demanded his removal, led to a dead-
lock: for the first time in history, no ruling coali-
tion could be formed after the elections – on 
two separate occasions. After the third elections 
(March 2020), a government was formed, but 
only under the circumstances described above.
The party system: waiting for a turning 
point?
The challenges which the Israeli political system 
faces are largely universal among Western democ-
racies. These include: the personalisation of poli-
tics (the growing role of party leaders, who build 
up their position thanks to their media presence), 
Eighteen months of the provisional 
government’s operation and the 
first wave of the pandemic have 
demonstrated the resilience of the 
state and society. 
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nationalist tendencies, susceptibility to populism, 
polarisation of the media and society, the citizens’ 
declining trust in institutions and political par-
ties, and the power of new social movements. In 
Israel, however, respect for the adopted rule of 
law, procedures and the separation of powers 
prevails, although at the same time much use is 
made of rhetoric which undermines democratic 
values such as equality of status and rights for all 
citizens, but is unable to resolve the fundamental 
problems threatening democracy (the occupation 
of the Palestinian territories, inequalities of income, 
the incomplete participation of the Arab minority 
in the country’s social, economic and political life, 
and the role of religion in the life of the state)4.
The parliamentary elections in 2015 already sig-
nalled the trends which became fully visible during 
the crisis of 2019-20. The level of uncompromising 
stubbornness in the campaign reached previously 
unknown levels. Netanyahu’s statements against 
the Arab minority and the left helped Likud to win 
some voters away from other right-wing groups. 
The Joint List formed by the Arab parties and 
the high turnout made the representatives of 
this minority the third force in the Knesset. The 
‘balloon parties’ representing the centre and the 
left, which were prone to constant reshuffles, 
were rising rapidly in the polls (the centrist party 
Kadima, formed by splitters from Likud, had even 
won the 2009 elections), but they then split up 
and reformed into new configurations before the 
next elections; despite this they maintained stable 
levels of support (usually at around 20-25%), but 
still suffer from a weak capacity to form coalitions, 
which they could only overcome by forming an 
alliance with the Arab parties5. Such an alliance has 
not yet taken place, for these reasons: the Jewish 
parties are reluctant to undertake the political risk 
of cooperating with non-Zionist groups; the Arab 
politicians are reluctance to legitimise Zionism 
by participating in the coalition (although this 
has not prevented those parties, who have been 
4 I. Galnor, ‘Israeli democracy under stress’ in J. Peters, R.G. 
Pinfold (ed.), Understanding Israel. Political, Societal and 
Security Challenges, London 2018, pp. 29–45.
5 N. Chazan, ‘Making Sense of the Israeli Elections’, Fathom, 
winter 2015, www.fathomjournal.org.
part of the Knesset from the very beginning, from 
taking an active part in the legislative process); 
and the Arab groups represent a broad spectrum 
of conflicting views, from Marxist to Islamist.
The 2019-20 election results confirmed these 
trends, while at the same time suggesting the 
possibility that some of these paradigms could be 
altered. The entry into the government of Gantz’s 
Blue and White group, especially the Labour Party, 
has broken the perception of the centre-left as un-
able to participate in the work of a cabinet, some 
members of which are ultra-Orthodox groups: 
this stereotype has developed over the last two 
decades, although it was previously unremarkable 
to see both groups in joint governments. Moreover, 
according to the Israeli media, the ultra-Orthodox 
Shas party played a significant role in establishing 
the coalition, and took on the roles of intermedi-
ary and mediator between Netanyahu and Gantz. 
However, this ultra-Orthodox alliance with the 
centre could be easily undermined in disputes, 
for example over minority rights.
As for the centre and the left, it should also be 
noted that the future of the Blue and White group 
is uncertain, and depends primarily on whether 
Gantz succeeds in taking over the premiership 
from Netanyahu in November 2021. The current 
parliament gives opposition leader Lapid a chance 
to boost the standing of his group Yesh Atid.
Moreover, while the majority of the Knesset’s 
Jewish members are still members of right-wing 
parties, the most important signal of upcoming 
changes may come from Yamina, a conservative 
religious-national party which has chosen to re-
main outside the ruling coalition. Its leader, Naftali 
Bennett – a consistent critic of the government’s 
policy towards the pandemic – is rapidly rising in 
popularity, and he will seek the leadership of the 
right. The secular right, represented by Israel Our 
The attitude of the political class 
towards the prime minister, and 
their uncertainty as to his plans, 
determine the functioning of the 
government and parliament.
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Home under Avigdor Lieberman, is also in oppo-
sition, but has rejected the possibility of further 
cooperation with the ultra-orthodox parties.
It is significant that the Joint List is still the third 
parliamentary force. Gantz’s efforts after the 
March elections to form a centre-left government 
with external support from the Joint List failed, 
due to opposition from some of his backers to any 
formula that would have given the Arab parties 
a real influence on the government. It seems, 
however, that the Arab groups are more and 
more ready to become involved in the running 
of the state. A growing part of the centre-left 
Israeli establishment is also coming round to such 
a solution.
Prospects
The 18 months of the provisional government’s 
operation and the first wave of the pandemic 
have demonstrated the resilience of the Israeli 
state, as well as the public’s ability to temporarily 
adapt, discipline and mobilise itself. In the face 
of the political crisis, new constitutional solutions 
have been proposed, largely derived from the 
personal dispute over Netanyahu. Three institu-
tions have emerged strengthened from the crisis: 
the president, who successfully played the role 
of peacemaker and whose demand for a govern-
ment of unity to be created has been fulfilled; the 
Supreme Court, which has reaffirmed its role as 
an apolitical legal arbitrator during the verification 
of the constitutionally controversial provisions of 
the coalition agreement, and while considering 
various petitions aimed at preventing the prime 
minister from remaining in office; and the ‘attor-
ney general’ (the legal adviser to the government), 
who has also proven himself to be a figure above 
party and a defender of the rule of law.
At the same time, the attitude of the political class 
towards the prime minister and their uncertainty 
as to his plans still determine the operation of the 
government and parliament. When Netanyahu 
was charged, he lost his right to serve as a minister. 
The government is large and internally divided, 
and the opposition in the Knesset is active, which 
further reduces the prime minister’s power. As of 
January 2021, he will have to attend his trial in 
a district court up to three times a week, which 
may encourage applications to the Supreme Court 
to issue a declaration of his incapacity to hold of-
fice. In this situation, Netanyahu may want to call 
yet more early elections, although this seems 
unlikely as long as Likud is lagging behind in the 
polls (confidence in the prime minister himself 
has also fallen significantly).
The tensions which the ruling coalition is facing 
result not only from party arithmetic and con-
flicting interests, or uncertainty about the prime 
minister’s plans, but also from the second wave 
of the pandemic, and the economic crisis associ-
ated with it, and the increasing public protests.
Israel coped well with the first COVID-19 wave, 
but its economy suffered significantly. Managing 
the second wave of infections in July turned out 
to be much more difficult due to the reduced so-
cial consent to the imposition of restrictions. This 
growing frustration has been expressed in protests 
by groups who have been affected by the crisis 
and are disenchanted with the way the pandemic 
has been managed: young people who have lost 
their jobs, and the self-employed and small- and 
medium-sized enterprises. Their demonstrations 
have coincided with those of the ‘black flags’ 
movement, who have demanded the resigna-
tion of the prime minister due to the charges 
against him and his focus on personal profit. The 
new protesters largely share the demands of this 
movement, highlighting Netanyahu’s recent ef-
forts to win significant tax breaks for himself. The 
demonstrators also include Likud voters, whose 
pauperisation may translate into a crisis of support 
for the party. These demonstrations are escalat-
ing in range (they are covering more and more 
locations in different towns and cities), as is their 
size and violence; this has led to clashes with the 
police and the arrests of demonstrators on charges 
of violating public order.
If the budget is not passed by 25 Au-
gust, the Knesset will automatically 
be dissolved.
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One characteristic of these new phenomena in 
Israeli society – the distrust of power and the re-
fusal to limit one’s own subordination – has been 
the attitude displayed by some restaurateurs who 
refused to comply with the planned restrictions. 
There is also rising discontent among the ultra-
Orthodox, who have been disappointed by the 
attitude of their leaders (during the first wave of 
the pandemic, the lack of effective communica-
tion led to a situation in which the ultra-Orthodox 
constituted the majority of those infected6; dur-
ing the second wave, they felt stigmatised and 
discriminated against by the restrictions imposed 
on their districts, which they felt to be excessive).
The public disputes over the management of the 
pandemic concern the scale of the restrictions, 
their impact on citizens’ rights, the formula and 
scope of the state’s support for entrepreneurs 
and consumers, and the procedures related to the 
government’s powers, in relation to parliament’s 
prerogatives of legislation and supervision. Not 
only has this led to conflicts between the coalition 
and the opposition, and between the government 
blocs, but it has also revealed tensions within the 
hitherto disciplined Likud group.
Another dispute has flared up over the state budg-
et. While the Gantz camp and the Shas party 
have been pushing through a coalition-compliant 
budget for the rest of 2020 and 2021, the prime 
minister, backed by the finance minister and the 
opposition Lapid party, want to prepare a bill that 
covers the current year alone. If the budget is not 
passed by 25 August, this will mean the automatic 
dissolution of the Knesset. The same will happen 
if a budget for 2020 alone is passed, and there 
is no subsequent on a budget for 2021 by the 
6 M. Matusiak, ‘Ultraorthodox Jews in Israel – epidemic 
as a measure of challenges’, OSW Commentary, no. 341, 
23 June 2020, www.osw.waw.pl.
end of next March. This dispute could serve as 
a tool for the prime minister to end the coalition 
and bring the elections forward. If a two-year 
budget is adopted in August, that will indicate 
that Netanyahu does indeed intend to hand his 
office over to Gantz in November 2021.
Issues related to how the judiciary as broadly 
understood functions, as well as to the sphere 
of civil liberties and customs, will cause further 
tensions as well. Opposition groups on the right 
and left are proposing controversial legislative 
proposals, in order to set the coalition partners 
against each other and to make clear their own 
agendas. This has become a substitute for a non-
stop election campaign. Netanyahu’s position on 
these matters will primarily be motivated by his 
desire to weaken his rivals on the right. Gantz will 
want to show that his presence in the government 
does not mean giving up the principles of the 
rule of law or the implementation policies that 
include all social groups. The coalition partners 
have not taken part in some of the controversial 
votes, but their participation in some of them, 
and their repeated threats to submit their own 
projects for discussion, are still undermining the 
coalition’s unity.
The tensions in the government, as well as those 
resulting from the mass protests, will hinder the 
decision-making process and make the coalition 
agreement increasingly fragile. In the medium term, 
Gantz’s takeover as prime minister in November 
2021 would provide a chance for a new opening 
within the Israeli party system, as it would serve as 
a response to the problem of Netanyahu appearing 
unchallengeable. At present, however, the chances 
of such a solution are difficult to estimate.
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APPENdIx
The balance of power in the Israeli parliament (as of July 2020)
Group name Number of seats Role in the political system
Likud 36 Coalition – Netanyahu’s bloc
Yesh Atid 16 Opposition
Blue and White 15 Coalition – Gantz’s bloc
Joint List 15 Opposition
Shas 9 Coalition – Netanyahu’s bloc
United Torah Judaism 7 Coalition – Netanyahu’s bloc
Israel Our Home 7 Opposition
Yamina 5 Opposition
Meretz – Democratic Union 3 Opposition
Labour Party 3 Coalition – Gantz’s bloc
Derekh Eretz 2 Coalition – Gantz’s bloc
The Jewish Home 1 Coalition – Netanyahu’s bloc
Gesher 1 Coalition – Netanyahu’s bloc
